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Several recent studies have looked for evidence on convergence, defined here as the tendency for poor economies to grow faster than rich economies. The clearest empirical support for con:vergence comes from economies that,, except for initial conditions, appear .. -similar. Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) reported convergence for OECD countries. Barro · · and Sala-i-Martin (199lb, 1991c) found ,that convergence occurred for the U.S. states '..and the regions of Europe and· Japan.at a·rate.of about .. 2% per year_.··· .Moreover; for the.·., .... :\' U.S. states, state product per capita and state personal income per capita converged at roughly the same rate.
The evidence from larger samples of countries is more controversial. Romer (1987) ·and Rebelo (1991 ) 'emphasized the lack of correlation between initial per capita GDP ·--and the subsequent per capita growth rate for a broad sample of about 100 countries.
They interpreted this finding as evidence against the convergence implications of the · neoclassical growth model. . .Yet an alternative interpretation is that these economies, unlike the OECD countries and U.S. states, have substantially different steady states.
·These differences can reflect disparities in levels of technology, government policies that amount to levels of technology, and preferences that affect the saving rate and fertility. Barro (1991) , Levine and Renelt (1990) , and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) reported that, after controlling for differences in rates of accumulation in human and physical capital and some other variables, countries converge at a rate of about 2% per year.
Hence, if one allows for heterogeneity, all the data sets confirm that convergence is slow but significant. ··Standard theories of economic.growth cannot easily explain this finding of . convergence. Consider, for example, the neoclassical growth model with diminishing returns to capital. As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw, Romer; and Weil ... ~ : .. ..:.. ,: (1992) pointed out, this model can explain the observed rate of conditional convergence if one assumes that these economies are . . closed and that the capital share is about 0.8. A capital share this large is reasonable if capital is viewed broadly to include human and . . physical components. (A more conventional capital share of around 0.3 implies much faster convergence'than. that observed in:the.data.) Yet the.assumption of a closed ..
" economy is more· difficult to justify, espedally when applied .tO' economies like ·the u~s; .... Similarly, the usual endogenous growth models for closed economies cannot fully account for the evidence. The one-sector, AK, model without diminishing returns can explain differences in output per person without differences in real interest rates. But this type of model is inconsistent with convergence if each economy has a fixed· technology parameter, A. Two-sector endogenous growth models can explain convergence based on imbalances between physical and human capital (see Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin [1991] ). But real interest rates would differ across closed economies and the imbalances would vanish instantaneously across open economies.
The main purpose of this paper is to construct a model of economic growth that is consistent with the growing body of evidence on convergence. We want, in particular, to explain gradual convergence in output and income per person while allowing for an ·international credit market that equates the real interest rates across economies. The key to our model is that capital is only partially mobile: borrowing is possible to finance accumulation of physical capital but not accumulation of human capital. We show that .,.._'.:;.: .. ,:. The paper is organized' as follows. -Sectiond:.presentsthe elements of the model. Section II considers a closed economy, and Section III deals with an open economy with perfect capital mobility. These two well-:c-known polar.cases provide useful.benchmar.ks · -·:fo:r·comparison:· ·section· IV"thencconsiders;q)artial.:capital. mobility;.in ,which.,borrowing.'" _, is possible to finance physical capital, but not human capital. Section V discusses the quantitative relation between the theory and the empirical evidence, and Section VI concludes.
I. The Model
Output is produced with three inputs: physical and human capital and a nonreproducible factor, which we view as raw labor. We assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas:
where a>O, /3>0, a+,8<1, Y is output, K the stock of physical capital, H the stock of human capital, 1 the quantity of raw labor, and A a fixed technology parameter. Raw labor grows at the constant, exogenous rate n, and g is the constant, exogenous rate of labor-augmenting technological progress. We assume a one-sector production technology in which physical capital, human capital, and consumables are perfectly substitutable uses of output. If we work as is customary in units of effective labor-y:Y/Legt, k:K/Legt, h:H/Legt_then the production function is given in , Equation (1) implies that. the elasticity of substitution. between k and h is one.
, . W~ begin with,this assumption to keep the model as simple as possible.· This assumption is not innocuous, however, and we examine later how the analysis differs when we allow for different elasticities of substitution between the two capital stocks.
' The households own the three inputs and rent them to the firms at competitive . ' ·· rental prices:~ Firms pay a proportional tax at rater on output. We interpret this tax to include various elements that affect the incentives to accumulate capital; for example, T includes the risk of expropriation by the government, strong labor unions, or foreign . inyaders. The.after-tax cash flow for the representative firm is given in units of effective labor by (2) where w is the wage rate, Rk is the rental price of physical capital, and Rh is the rental price of human capital. In the absence of adjustment costs, the maximization of the . present value of future cash flows is equivalent to the maximization of profit in each period. The firm therefore equates the marginal products to the rental prices: (4) where C is per capita ·consumption, p the subjective rate of time preference, and 0 the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Population, ent, corresponds to the labor force.
The households own the physical and human capital and also have the net stock of debt, d, per unit of effective labor. They receive income from wages and rentals and spend this income on accumulation of physical capital, accumulation of human capital, and consumption. Hence, the budget constraint is
where r is the real interest rate, c:Ce-g\ and a dot over a variable represents its time derivative. This equation assumes that the relative prices of consumables, physical capital, and human capital are always fixed at unity, and that physical and human capital depreciate at the same rate, 8. We also assume that none of the taxes collected are remitted to households, although our results would not change if these revenues showed up as lump-sum transfers or as government services that did not interact with the choices of consumption.
Households can borrow and lend at the real interest rate r on the domestic bond market. In a closed economy, the debt, d, is zero for the representative household and r is determined by the equilibrium of saving and investment at the national level. In an open economy, r is determined at the world level and d-the foreign debt per effective worker--can be positive or negative.
To simplify the exposition, we integrate the, households and firms by substituting the first-'Order conditions from·equation (3} into'the'budget constraintcinequation(5)· . . -··· to get
Households maximize utility from equation (4) subject to equation (6) The first environment is the closed economy, in which households can borrow and lend on the domestic capital market at the rater, but cannot borrow or lend on international markets. Hence, d=O, and the only difference from the standard Ramsey model is that the technology involves two kinds of capital. The rate of return, r, must equal the net returns on the two kinds of capital, Rk-8 and Rh-8, where the rental prices are given in equations (3a) and (3b). These equations imply k/h = a/,B at all points in time. If the initial value of k/h differs from a/ ,B, then households "jump" to the desired ratio. Since we assume no adjustment costs or irreversibility constraints, this jump is feasible, that is, households can convert excess human capital into physical capital or vice versa.1 We can then rewrite the budget constraint from equation (6) The household's problem now corresponds to the standard formulation in the neoclassical growth model (Ramsey [1928] , Cass (1965] , and Koopmans [1965] ), except that the production function is less concave: the capital share is a+,8, which · . corresponds to physical and human capital, rather than a, which corresponds only to physical capital. Diminishing returns therefore set in more slowly.
The Euler equation characterizing the solution is familiar:
where (1--T)A( a+,B)za+,B-l is the after-tax marginal product of capital, which also equals r+5. Equations (7) and (8) The steady-state growth rate of the variables in units of effective labor is zero.
The per capita variables grow accordingly at the rate of productivity growth, g, and the level variables grow at the rate of growth of population plus productivity, n+g. The 1If physical or human capital are irreversible (as is realistic in most situations), then the model involves transitional dynamics of the sort described for two-capital-goods models in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991 Note that this potential resolution of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle does not rely on the existence of two capital goods, but applies also to the standard Ramsey model
and to a variety of other growth models. Heterogeneity in~the incentives to accumulate capital-measured here by a broad concept of the tax rate T--Can explain the positive correlation between investment and saving rates without invoking imperfect international capital markets.
C. Convergence during the Transition
The transitional dynamics of the model can be studied graphically using the familiar phase diagram in. Figure 1 . The c=O equation generates the modified golden rule, and the z=O condition defines a hump-shaped curve.that reaches its maximum at the golden-rule level of broad capital. The model displays saddle-path stability, and the transversality condition ensures that the economy follows the saddle path during the transition.
To quantify the convergence implications of the model, we follow Barro and Sala:..--i--Martin (1992) and log-linearize the system, equations (7) and (8), around,the steady state. The growth rate of y between times 0 and t can then be written as
That is, the growth rate is a negative function of initial income, y(O), after controlling for the steady-state level of income, y*. The convergence rate, .A, is a complicated function of the parameters of the model: 2
Equation ( 2This formula corresponds to the one derived in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) , except that the capital share is now o.+{J rather than o..
The ratio of capital stocks, k/h, remains constant during the transition, but the ratio ofeach stock to GDP, k/y and h/y,.rises as the economy approaches the steady state. The steady increase in k/y conflicts with the view associated with Kaldor (1961) that the capital-output ratio is virtually constant during the process of development. If a.+/3 = .8, however, then diminishing returns set in slowly and the model predicts only moderatechangesin-k/y:;::iLkand fl..double, then, 0 k/.ytises··by.'1'5%., Since.k/y.is<not.
•·: .·.,·· .. ;_,,_,,.. precisely constant empirically, the prediction of a slowly rising k/y cannot be considered a serious shortcoming of the theory.
The theory also implies that the marginal products of physical and human capital, and hence, the real interest rate, r, would decline over time. If a.+ f3 = .8 and r begins at 8%, for example, then a doubling of k and h implies that r would fall to 6.9%. This slow decline of the real interest rate-a reflection of the slow onset of diminishing returns-does not conflict with empirical evidence.
The expression for A in equation (13) simplifies if, following Solow (1956) , we asrnme a constant gross saving rate. This assumption amounts to a restriction on the parameters of the model (see Kurz [1968] ). The gross saving rate is constant if
and the corresponding gross saving rate is then
In this case, the accumulation constraint in equation (7) can be written as
and the steady-state capital intensity is
Equation (12)··still provides.aJog-linear.approximation to the growth rate, but .the convergence coefficient simplifies to (17)
.A= (1--a-,B)(B+n+g) which corresponds to the expression given in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992 
III. The Open Economy with Perfect Capital Mobility
Suppose now that households can borrow and lend at the going interest rate on world capital· markets. We assume;that the country is smallrelativeto the rest of the world and faces a constant world real interest rate, rw, which pegs the domestic rate, r. 4
. , The rate rw would be constant if:theworld werein the kind oLsteady state that we described above for a closed economy. Goods are tradable internationally, but labor cannot migrate.
The interest rate, r, again equals the net returns on the two kinds of capital, Rk-8
and Rh-8, where the rental prices are given in equations (3a) and (3b ). But since r=rw, 3The ratio was computed from data in Citibase, defining gross investment to include public investment for non-,military and military purposes. The average.ratio for private investment only is .17. We may also want to add consumer-durables purchases, which averaged 8% of GDP from 1960 to 1990. A further small adjustment would modify GDP to include the service flows from government capital (to the extent that these flows were not already reflected in private output) and consumer durables .
13
. ,: .4As .. in Barro and Sala~i-Martin (199lb, chapter 2); we assume.rw>;g+n, a_ condition that ensures that the present value of future wages is bounded. ·Strictly speaking, the smallcountry assumption also requires rw~p+Bg; otherwise, the country 1 s assets and consumption will grow faster than the world 1 s, and the country will eventually not be small. a constant, the implied values of k and h-and hence, y-are also constant. In other words, the model predicts that a small open economy will jump instantaneously to its steady-state levels of output, physical capital, and human capital per effective worker and will remain there forever. The predicted rates of convergence for output and capital are infinite, a result that conflicts sharply with the empirical evidence discussed earlier.
14 We could eliminate the'infinite<speeds 'of 1 convergence·'by introdttcing··adjustment,eost-s~ . , , , , .. ,,.~~·N .. · and irreversibility conditions for physical and human capital. Plausible modifications along these lines do not, however, eliminate the counterfactual prediction that .·convergence rates would be rapid in an open economy with perfect capital mobility. 5
We:therefore·nowturn.to.amodel that, 1 allows for imperfect capital mobility.
IV. The Open Economy with Partial Capital Mobility
A. Laws of Motion.
We now assume that the amount of debt, d, cannot exceed the quantity of physical capital, k. This assumption introduces an asymmetry between the two capital stocks: k can be used as collateral for international borrowing whereas h cannot.a We are assuming implicitly that domestic residents own the physical capital stock but may obtain part or all of the financing for this stock by issuing bonds to foreigners. The results would be the same if we allowed for direct foreign investment, in which case the 5The model has other unappealing implications.· As first conjectured by Ramsey (1928) , if countries differ in their discount rates, p, then the most patient country asymptotically owns all the assets in the world, including all claims on human capital and raw labor. For the rest of the countries, c approaches zero, and the debt eventually mortgages all domestic capital and raw labor. The model also predicts, counterfactually, that GDP would typically behave very differently from GNP. acohen and Sachs (1984) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991b, chapter 2 ) examine a ··· model•with one capital good in which the borrowing constraint;amounts to d~vk, where
O~~l. In other words, only the fraction v of capital serves as collateral. The model considered in the text differs in that k and h are imperfect substitutes as inputs to production, and the choices between k and h determine the fraction of broad capital, k+h, that constitutes collateral .
.,, -.:.~.. ;
foreigners would own part of the physical capital stock rather than bonds. The · important assumption is that domestic residents cannot borrow with human capital or rawlabortas collateral and that foreigners cannot own domestic human capital or raw labor. We are, in particular, ruling out any international migration of labor.
There are various ways to motivate.the borrowing .constraint. Physical capitalis .
·· more easily repossessed than human ·capital and-is therefore morereadily· financed· with· debt. Physical capital is also more amenable to direct foreign investment: a person can own a factory but not someone else's stream of labor income. Finally, one can abandon the terms, "physical capital" and "human capital," and recognize that not all investments can be financed through perfect capital markets. The key distinction between k and h is not the physical nature of the capital but whether the cumulated goods serve as collateral for borrowing on world markets.
We still assume that the world interest rate, rw, fa constant.at its steady-state value. We assume also that rw = p+Bg, the steady-state interest rate that would apply · if the domestic economy were closed. That is, the home economy is neither more nor less impatient than the world as a whole. The initial quantity of assets per effective 
Equation (18) SThe precise constancy of k/y in our model depends on the fixity of the world interest rate, rw, and on the assumption that the production function is Cobb-Douglas. This production function implies that the average product of capital, y /k, is proportional to ·· the marginal product. Since the marginal product of capital, net ofdepreciation and taxes, equals the fixed world interest rate, rw, the average product, y /k, must be constant. In the analysis considered later, which departs from a Cobb-Douglas technology, the ratio y /k is not precisely constant along the transition path. The budget constraint from equation ( 6) can-be combined with the. reduced-form production functionfrom equation (19), theborrowjng . . constraint, d=k,.and.the condition, (rw+o)k = (1-r)ay from equation (18), to get the revised budget constraint:
Note that the term, -a(l-'1")Bh€ = -a(l-r)y, corresponds to the flow of rental payments on physical capital, (rw +8)k (see equation [18] ). Since d""' .' """k, this term equals the net factor payments from abroad and therefore equals the difference between GNP and GDP. GDP exceeds GNP because the country is constrained.on the international.. cre<;lit market and therefore has the positive foreign debt, d=k.
Households now maximize utility from equation (4) subject to the budget constraint in equation (20) 
where (1-r)(l-a)B Eh E-l = (1-r)B,Bh E-l is the after-tax marginal product of human capital.. Equations (20) and (21) Because we assumed rw=p+Og, the steady .state is the same as that for the closed economy. Jn particular,hli:=z"'f3/(a+{3), as in equation (10)., where z* is the steady-state . quantity of broad capital for the closed economy, given in equation {9). Hence, the opportunity to borrow on the world credit market does not influence the steady state, but-will turn out to affect the speed of convergence. 9 B. Convergence Along the Transition.
The system described by equations (20) and (21) 'withthe-closed economy: equation (20) corresponds to equation (7) and equation (21) ·to equation (8) .. The only differences are that equation (20) contains (1-a)B as a proportional constant in the production function, whereas equation (7) has A; the capital-stock variable is h rather than z:h+k; and the exponent on the capital stock is E:{3/(l-a.) rather than a.+{3. Since f. and a.+{3 are positive and less than one-that is, both models feature diminishing returns-the dynamics of the models are essentially the same. Equation (13) determines the convergence coefficient, .X, for the closed economy.
The only difference in the credit-constrained open economy is that a.+{3 has to be replaced by E:{3/(l-a.). (Recall that the level of the production technology does not influence the rate of convergence.) Hence, the convergence coefficient for the loglinearized version of the credit-constrained open economy is given by 9If we had assumed rw <p+ Og-so that the home economy is more impatient than the rest of the world (seen. 7)-then the availability of foreign borrowing would also affect the steady-state position. The open economy would have higher steady-state capital intensities, h* and k*, than the closed economy.
I
where cp is again equal to p-n-(1-0)g > 0. The coefficient determined from equation (22) Recall that an open economy with perfect capital mobility converges at an infinite rate. Therefore, our finding is that an open economy with partial capital mobility looks much more like a closed economy than a fully open economy. Although we derived this . result so far only for a particular set of parameter values, the conclusion is much more 10If a.=0, so that no capital constitutes collateral, then E=/J and ,\ from equation (22) corresponds to the value from equation (13) Equation (19) implies that the growth rate of y is E times the growth rate of h,·where E is between zero and one. The ratio, h/y, therefore rises steadily during the transition.
Recall, however, that equation (18) implies that the ratio, k/y, is constant throughout.
Therefore, k grows at the same rate as y and the ratio of human to physical capital, h/k, . .increases during the transition. Note that, although physical capital serves fully as collateral,,k nevertheless rises gradually toward its steady-state value, k*. The reason is the constraint of domestic saving on the accumulation of human capital and the 'complementarity between h and kin, the production function. When h is low the schedule for the marginal product of physical capital is low; hence, k<k* follows even though domestic producers can finance all acquisitions of physical capital with foreign borrowing. ·The gradual increase of human capital impacts positively on the marginal product of physical capital and leads thereby to an expansion of k.
Foreign borrowing occurs only on loans secured by physical capital, and the interest rate on these loans is pegged at the world rate, rw. We can also imagine a domestic credit market, although the setting with a representative domestic agent always ends up with a zero volume of borrowing on this market. For loans that are secured by physical capital, the shadow interest rate on the domestic market must also be rw. If we assume that human capital and raw labor do not serve domestically as collateral, then the shadow interest rate on the domestic market with these forms of security is infinity (or at least high enough to drive desired borrowing to zero), just as it is on the world market.
We might assume instead that human capital and raw labor serve as collateral for .:-domestic borrowing but not for foreign borrowing. This.situation would apply if the legal system enforces loan contracts based on labor income when the creditor is domestic, but not when the creditor is foreign.11 In this case, the shadow interest rate 21 on domestic lending, collateralized by labor income, equals the·net,marginal·produet·of ... · ,,,.
human capital. This net marginal product begins at a relatively high value (corresponding to the low starting stock, h [O] ) and then falls gradually toward the steady-state value, rw. Thus, the transition features a decrease in the spread between this kind of domestic interest rate and the world rate, rw. An example would be the · curb market forinformahlending in Korea (see: Collins and Park [1989, p. 353] We can again simplify the formula for the rate of convergence if we assume a . constant gross saving rate. The required value of ()for a constant gross saving rate is
and the corresponding gross saving rate (expressed relative to GNP) is s = (1-r)/B*.
The rate of convergence is then .11If the foreign. loans are made directly to the domestic government, .then the collateral ·cinvolves the security put up by the government. Domestic physical capital may then also not serve well as collateral on foreign loans-if the home government does not force itself to pay up-although it may work better on domestic loans (if the government enforces private loan contracts on the domestic market with physical capital as collateral).
(24)
For the parameters used before, 9* = 1.9, s = .37, and>. = .023.
Another interesting implication of this model is that, despite the existence of international borrowing and lending, the convergence properties of gross national 22 product and gross domestic.productare the same. As.noted,before, the net·factor ,, . ··.
income from abroad is -(rw+fi)k = -(1-r)ay. Therefore,
GNP (per unit of effective labor) = y -(1-r)ay = y[l-a(l-r)]
Since GNP is proportional to GDP, which corresponds toy, the convergence rates for GNP and GDP are the same. This result suggests that data sets that involve GDP are likely to generate similar rates of convergence as those that involve GNP or measures of national income. Some confirmation of this prediction comes from the study of the U.S.
states by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991a) : the rates of convergence are similar for gross state product per capita and state personal income per capita.
The model implies that the gap between GDP and GNP would be large for a
credit-constrained open economy: roughly 20% of GDP for the parameter values ( a=.3, r=. 3) assumed before. The current-account deficit, which equals the change in physical capital, is correspondingly large. It equals 15% of GDP in the steady state for the parameters assumed before.
It is unusual to find developing countries that have values this high for the GDP-GNP gap and the current-account deficit.12 We can reconcile the theory with this observation by noting first, that many developing countries are insufficiently 12one counter-example is Singapore: its current-account deficit was between 10 and 20% of GDP throughout the 1970s (see International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 1991) .
productive to be credit constrained, and second, that the collateral for international debt may be substantially narrower than physical capital. If the coefficient a were less than .3, then the predicted ratios for the GDP-GNP gap and the current-account deficit would be correspondingly smaller .
. "' V. Elasticity of Substitution between.CapitatStocks
The levels of k and h determine the fraction of capital that serves as collateral-a higher fraction means that the economy is more open and therefore converges more rapidly to its steady-state position. The choice between k and h depends on how these ,, · two forms 0Lcapital 1 interact as:inputs into the production function. We have assumed thus far that the production possibilities are Cobb-Douglas so that the elasticity of substitution between k and h is unity. If the two types of capital are more or less
. substitutable in the production function, then the chosen values of k and h and therefore the model's convergence properties will differ from those found before. We illustrate this behavior by generalizing to a CES production function.
The production function for output per worker is now
where 0<77<1, O<a<l, O<b<l, -m<¢<1, and the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between k and his 1/(1-¢). The parameter 17 is the share of broad capital in output.13 The parameters, a and b, determine how the steady-state share of physical 13The production function for the level of output can be written as
where Z is a broad measure of capital, given by capital, x;:k* /(k*+h*), changes as the substitution parameter, 1/J, varies between cu and 1.
As ' !/>-+ cu, the production function approaches fixed proportions, y = A· MIN[bk,
(1 The household budget constraint, analogous to equation (6), now generalizes to
The elasticity of substitution between Z and L is still assumed to be one.
14These results depend .on the condition, rw = p+ Og. in this case, the home economy is . . _ . unconstrained on the credit market in the steady state, and .hence, the potential to use k as collateral imparts no asymptotic advantage to kover h. ·As 1/>-+1, the economy therefore specializes in the steady state in the form of capital that is more productive. If rw < p+Og, then k's usage as collateral imparts an asymptotic advantage. As 1/>-+1, the economy then specializes ink in the steady state even if a+b is somewhat less than 1. We consider again a credit-constrained economy for which d=k applies and the world interest rate equals the constant rw. The budget constraint then simplifies to
Since k serves as collateral on the world credit market, we have (27) where fk is ,the marginal product of k, which can be calculated from equation (26). The · ·budget constraint therefore becomes is
The Euler equation is
where fh is the marginal product of h, which can be computed from equation (26).
Equation (29) generalizes equation (21).
If we use the partial derivatives computed from equation (26) to substitute out for fk and fh, then equations (27)- (29) define a dynamic system of equations ink, h, and c.
In the Cobb-Douglas case, it was easy to eliminate k and then deal with the dynamic 25 1s1n the Cobb-Douglas case, fk is the fraction a of the average product, f(k,h)/k, and the term in brackets in equation (28) simplifies to (1-a)·f(k,h) (see equation (20] The coefficient .X is more sensitive to variations in TJ, the broad capital share. We have assumed throughout that·economies can be modeled by a representative consumer. If capital-market imperfections of the sort considered here are important, however, then this assumption may cause problems: the credit constraints would influence households in different ways. At any time, some households would face binding borrowing constraints, whereas others would not.
Perhaps the model in this paper is best applied not to countries or even to states but to families. The model may, in this context, be useful for explaining the. dynamics .
and distribution of wealth. Suppose, for example, that all families were described by the · model in this paper and that they differed only by their rate of time preference. In steady state, the time preference of the most patient families would determine the interest rate; these families would be the most highly educated, and they would own all the economy's physical capital. The less patient families would face binding borrowing constraints, and they would own no physical capital. Although these families would save to accumulate human.capital, they would have a lower level of human capital than the more patient families. Thus, in this economy, we would observe a positive correlation between ownership of human and non'-human wealth.· ·We would ·also see a highly concentrated. distribution of non-human wealth and a more diffuse distribution of human wealth. These predictions seem.consistent'with the facts: .80
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